

MARCH, 1947

Galluping Consumption
TOM HARRISSON

Labour Britain and American Progressives
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A Great Woman
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PETER SELF and "ADMINISTRATOR"

Correspondence

Book Reviews

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CONTENTS

		Page
GALLUPING CONSUMPTION	by Tom Harrisson	3
LABOUR BRITAIN AND AMERICAN PROGRESSIVES	by David C. Williams	7
A GREAT WOMAN	by A. Susan Lawrence	10
BRITISH POLICY IN GREECE	by Tom McKitterick	11
LOCAL GOVERNMFNT AND THE COMMUNITY	by Peter Self and "Administrator"	15
CORRESPONDENCE		22
BOOK REVIEWS		23

EDITORIAL

In January we had official warning—if further warning were needed—in the form of the White Paper bearing the rather cumbersome title " Statement on the Economic Considerations Affecting Relations Between Employers and Workers ". It seemed at the time as if one of the functions of the White Paper, which offered no solutions to the problems it stated, was to soften up public opinion for things to come. And in February things came.

The issues for which the White Paper demanded attention were our adverse foreign trade balance, the need for higher productivity and a further increase in exports, the possible danger of inflation, and the shortage of manpower, especially in certain undermanned industries, e.g., mining, textiles, foundries, laundries. The fuel shortage which came to a head in February, though precipitated by phenomenally adverse weather, was a result of the shortage of manpower in the mines, through which it had been impossible to build up stocks. Of course the question can be pushed farther, and one can find in the history of the inter-war years and the war years the origins of manpower shortage in the mines. In any case, the scarcity of miners and of coal exists.

The solution to the manpower shortage recommended in some quarters is curtailment of the armed forces, and in others more use of foreign labour, and yet again a combination of the two. But it does not follow that an increment in the total labour force from these sources would go into, or stay in, the undermanned industries. Yet the pre-conditions do not so far seem to exist for creating wage differentials sufficient to attract labour into those industries.

But let us get the position in true perspective. The weather in February was an important and unpredictable contributory factor to the situation. Before the descent of ice, frost and blizzard—which under any regime would be deterrents to jubilation—the situation was far from one of unmitigated failure. In spite of all adverse conditions, in December 1946 this country was consuming, for instance, more sugar, cheese, fish, jam and syrup, tobacco,

beer and spirits than pre-war, 40 per cent. more liquid milk, and only a small percentage less tea and meat. The amount of electricity and gas made available was also far in excess of pre-war level. Production of ordinary motor cars was very nearly up to 1935 figures by November 1946, though production for the home market was only half the 1935 level, while more commercial motor vehicles were being produced both for export and for the home market.[1] In other words, while many real and serious shortages did exist, other seeming scarcities indicated that this country was consuming at full employment level, and that a considerable equalisation of consumption had taken place as between different sections of the population since before the war.

To turn to housing, the need obviously remains immense. Yet from April 1945 to December 1946 over 150,000 houses were completed in Great Britain (permanent 58,211; temporary 92,426). The re-housing programme had provided accommodation for 325,343 families.[2] The housing programme for 1947 envisages 240,000 new permanent houses, and 60,000 temporaries,[3] subject to possible shortages of raw materials, especially timber. If this aim is realised, the rate of building will already within two years of the end of the war be as high as in a good pre-war year.

Presumably the fuel shortage will ease with the passing of the worst of the winter—this may have taken place by the time this *Quarterly* appears. A figure in the region of two million people will have been deprived of work for a short period. That is serious, but it is not comparable to the prolonged mass unemployment of the 1930's. But will we, through inability to amass fuel stocks, remain at the mercy of the British climate? We may assume that some semi-permanent restrictions on the use of fuel and power will be introduced. But the only long-term remedy will be to take whatever steps are necessary—and they may need to be highly imaginative steps—to recruit man-power into the mines.

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[1] These figures are from the Monthly Digest of Statistics, December, 1946.
[2] Ministry of Health Statement, 28th January, 1947.
[3] Cmd. 7021.

GALLUPING CONSUMPTION

by Tom Harrisson

Tom Harrisson is Director of Mass-Observation (21 *Bloomsbury Street, W.C.*1), *sociologist, journalist and broadcaster. Served in the Far East during the war, and is only quite recently back from Central Borneo, where he worked among the hill-tribes.*

" They that approve a private opinion, call it opinion; but they that mislike it, heresy; and yet heresy signifies no more than private opinion ". Thus Hobbes in his *Leviathan*, three centuries back. Yet, ten years ago, the idea of any widescale *topical* social study of ourselves was completely novel in this country. Booth, Rowntree, Caradog Jones and others had made social surveys, often more properly classed as socio-economics. But the general day-to-day study of everyday British life, thought, speech, opinion and behaviour was still in embryo. The very idea horrified with threats of demagogy, super-snoopers, and so on.

When the idea of Mass-Observation was launched on an unexpectant public in 1937, it created a sensation. Soon after, the young Gallup Poll established a branch in England (the British Institute of Public Opinion). Several advertising agencies have for some time had " market-research " units operating in the same field, but as their work is nearly all done in private, they have contributed little to published sociological knowledge so far.

It has been a long struggle to establish the *idea* of such studies as accurate, respectable and important. But even at the Cabinet level total ignorance, and sometimes violent prejudice, have been replaced by—at the least—acceptance, and at the best sympathetic approval. P E P recently published a Broadsheet broadly supporting such surveys. In a January Brains' Trust, the speakers (including the Secretary of the Fabian Society) were unanimously pro-poll. Indeed, the change-over of public attitude has been so rapid that there is considerable danger of it becoming *too* uncritical. It is from this point of view that I write, without in the least wishing to belittle much important work in this field, recognised now by all informed persons.

PRINCE PHILIP AND MRS. SIMPSON

Wherever you turn nowadays, you are likely to find a poll. The *Sunday Pictorial* during January conducted a postal one, which showed 64 per cent. in favour of Princess Elizabeth marrying Prince Philip and 32 per cent. against. Just ten years before, national opinion had been deeply stirred by news of the attachment of the then King to Mrs. Simpson. Charles Madge, then working on the *Daily Mirror*, and myself as a freelance, were both very struck by the extreme discrepancy between published opinion (press, radio, etc.) and what people were *actually saying* in the Simpson crisis. This directly crystallised our ideas on the need for impartial, objective reporting; thus the innovation of Mass-Observation. Now, a decade later, no such event could pass without an intensive opinion reportage from many sources. It cannot be doubted that this is healthy and democratic. It makes political or partisan distortion of current events more difficult.

The biggest single factor that has contributed to the increased acceptance of opinion polls is their accuracy in predicting election results. But because people will tell which candidate they intend to put a cross against on polling day, this does not necessarily mean that they will tell all else with equal accuracy. Simple actions about which people have already made up their minds can be so predicted; but on most subjects people cannot express themselves by a simple cross, and often have difficulty in expressing themselves even in words. Because an astronomer can foretell exactly the moment of an eclipse of the moon, it doesn't mean that he can predict the next influenza epidemic in Scotland. Nor are all other users of his telescope automatically astronomers. The man at the seaside who accurately judges a passerby's weight at one glance, is not thereby qualified to cast his eye round an aircraft factory and estimate future production.

PREDICTION AND PRECISION

Poll predictions demonstrate the validity of the relationship between what people say and what they intend to do *in certain situations only*. In applying this method of measurement, great care is essential. An example. When people are asked their church-going habits, so many *say* they go to church that parsons would probably collapse if they saw such a congregation—assuming they could push in through the crowd. When the same people are asked about their pub-going habits, the number who will tell an interviewer (a stranger) they are " regulars " is so small that the brewers should soon be bankrupt.

In any type of measurement, you are always up against the difficulty of the social structure and class outlook of Britain, the continual " sanction " on giving " respectable " answers. Also the difficulty that people, even if they do not wish to impress, defend or obscure, genuinely have *not* worked out their top level verbal response into actual behaviour patterns. Even at the verbal level, there may be striking differences between what people say to a stranger, to a friend, to the wife or in the silent moments of the night. (The top level can be strictly described as *public* opinion, and the lower as *private* opinion.) Further, we have little information on the relationship between what people *say* and what people *do*. Even less do we know the relationship between what people say, do and *think*.

Therefore, we have to proceed with caution. It is perfectly valid to ask any question and give the results, *provided* the value and significance of these results are made perfectly clear. For instance, a recent Gallup Poll (*News Chronicle*, Jan. 13) asked people a well-phrased question:

> " Is it likely or unlikely that you will be sending any of your rationed foods to people in Germany ? "

5 per cent. said likely, 95 per cent. unlikely. It is not, of course, necessarily true that 5 per cent. will send parcels, or that it would not be possible to stimulate a much larger number to do so. But we have a useful top-level map of the situation existing *at the moment* in public opinion. If all polled questions were so clearly worded and limited, there would be few criticisms to make. Some are well done. Others are not—and these can have serious consequences.

PRESENTATION AND EMPHASIS

I do not propose here to go into the question of interviews, sampling, checks, etc.; they have been discussed in the P E P Report. The principles are now generally known, although many of the *ad hoc* investigations, such as the *Sunday Pictorial* one referred to above, still do not indicate their sample, which is indeed clearly " unrepresentative " of the nation as a whole.

Much less attention has been paid to commoner, easier mistakes. *Over-emphasis* in the question-wording is the commonest of these. Thus, a *Daily Express* poll of December 16 gets a large majority answering yes to the question: " Should the Government exercise its power to prosecute workers who take part in unofficial strikes ? " Questions framed in this way generally favour a yes answer. Or in a question by the British Institute of Public Opinion published in *Contact* (December 1946), which gets a heavy yes for the one-sided proposition: " Do you think that with commercial broadcasting big business is likely to exert political influence ? "

Mass-Observation recently asked two differently phrased questions to identical samples of working-class women, using the same investigators in the same small area. The question asked to one sample: " Do you believe in God ? "; to the other: " Do you believe there is a God or there isn't, or haven't you made up your mind ? " To the first question, 84 per cent. said " Yes " ; 5 per cent. " No "; and 11 per cent. " Don't know ". To the second question: 60 per cent. " Yes " ; 10 per cent. " No " ; 8 per cent. " Don't know "; no less than 22 per cent. " *Haven't made up my mind* ", etc.

Over-simplification is an associated difficulty. Those who wish to analyse results statistically and present them in popular form are tempted (unconsciously) to avoid the often *very* complex nature of people's answers, and to impose only simple alternatives. If there are a fair number of related questions asked at the same time, simplification does not matter so much, since other answers cross-check. Nor does it matter so much if the alternatives are based on or checked by other research. Where simplified questions are asked without supporting research, the results may unwittingly mislead. Thus a BIPO question (*News Chronicle*, Jan. 23):

> " Do you think that ill-treatment of children is due mainly to cruelty or to ignorance and bad conditions ? "

Over-interpretation is the most important common error. A recent example (known to have influenced Cabinet Ministers): when the *News Chronicle* (Dec. 2nd) featured a question " Do you think it is important that Britain should produce more goods ? ", 92 per cent. replied " important "; 2 per cent. " not important "; 6 per cent. " don't know ". This comes near to asking starving people: " Would you like more food ? ", as is implicitly recognised by the *News Chronicle's* supporting leader, which refers to the 2 per cent. who said more production was *unimportant* as a " lunatic fringe ". Yet a leader page article *interprets* the results of this question as follows (our italics):

> " An *overwhelming majority of the public* is now *fully* aware of the importance of the Government's drive for increased production . . . . . This *encouraging awareness* is the first *fact* that emerges from a Gallup Poll carried out to test public reaction to the production drive. . . . . "

The editorial alongside goes one further, interpreting the results as implying " *a gratifying realisation* " of the fact that " the greatest economic task before the country is to produce more wealth ". All this because most people answer yes to a leading question, to which admittedly only a " lunatic fringe " could answer no.

More extraordinary, because from an academic psychologist critical of others in this field, is Dr H. J. Eysenck's recently published (*Reynolds*, Dec. 29) " first large scale investigation into the social attitudes of the British people ". Typical is the opening paragraph:

> " Conservatives and Liberals believe that there will be another war within 25 years; Labour supporters do not."

This presumably means there is a *statistical tendency* for Conservatives to expect war more often, and for Socialists to expect it less often. But as it stands, this and supporting material in the *Reynolds* item gives a misleading impression, and one which could have considerable political effect.

USE AND CAUTION

The validity of polling methods (properly used) is beyond dispute. But their rapid development in this country, which—as compared with America, homeland of polls—is poorly off for experienced and wisely critical sociologists, is in danger of leading us to over-simplification, and to the misuse of a method extremely valuable in a limited field. At the present time, statistical questionnaire work is becoming something of an obsession. Interview questionnaires and random samples are being applied in all sorts of fields, often unsuitably. As most British sociologists have not been trained in natural science, they easily mistake statistics for scientific method. They erroneously believe that such quantitative expression of results is in itself scientific. In fact, of course, everything depends on the method's applicability to the problem studied, and on the basic hypotheses employed and tested. In many social problems, at the present stage, we do not know enough to make assumptions which enable us properly to apply exclusively quantitative methods of measurement.

It is no exaggeration to say that Sociology is potentially the most important science of our time. It is, therefore, particularly vital that we should be intelligent in our use of it. I cannot illustrate the dangers better than to recommend everyone interested to read J. P. Mayer's recently published *Sociology of Film* (Faber & Faber, 15/–). Using very limited statistical information, Dr Mayer has felt justified in adding quantities of personal generalisation and elaborate academic comparison. One has to make a careful analysis of his text to find out what it is all based on in the first place. So far as I can see, the whole 320 pages prove to be derived from: (1) about 20 essays from girls in a Hampstead progressive school; (2) 6 replies to a prize essay competition on liked and disliked films, from 800 competition forms which were distributed in one North Paddington cinema; (3) 85 replies to 1,000 questionnaires distributed through one Odeon Cinema Children's Club; (4) 68 letters from *Picturegoer* readers; (5) 42 questionnaires from one unspecified school class; the questionnaire contains well over 100 complicated items which had to be filled in by children age 10. Such deficiency in statistical method can be compensated for by good qualitative or observational material. But Dr. Mayer does not succeed in this. Yet this sort of book impresses genuinely interested persons such as Kingsley Martin, who reviewing it declared that Mayer "has full documentary evidence to present from questionnaires, prize essays, interviews, and personal observation and conversation".

We must beware lest the rush of success goes to our heads; lest we lose sight of the human wood for the percentage-marked trees. It is so much less trouble to reduce sociology to ample questionnaires, and thus avoid all the difficulties and discomforts involved in really getting down to the stuff of all social science—ordinary people eating, looking, laughing, worrying, hoping, working, drinking, talking to each other and crying out in sleep.

LABOUR BRITAIN AND AMERICAN PROGRESSIVES

by David C. Williams

DAVID C. WILLIAMS, Director of the London Bureau of the Union for Democratic Action Educational Fund Inc., was an American Rhodes Scholar at Oxford University, graduating in 1935. *He has since been engaged in teaching and in engineering research, and was executive secretary of the Ohio Federation of Teachers (affiliated with organised labour), secretary of the Ohio Joint CIO-AFL Legislative Committee, and a candidate for the Ohio Legislature in* 1944. *He is a member of the Fabian Society and of the St. Marylebone Local Fabian Society.*

The Fabian Society has often shown its interest in the public relations of the Labour Government. Fabians and others have complained that the achievements of the Government receive inadequate attention and credit abroad. In particular, they have complained that the section of the American public—liberal, progressive and trades union groups—which should be most sympathetic to Labour Britain seems at times most deeply alienated. An objective analysis of the forces moulding the reputation of Britain in leftwing America may therefore be of interest.

BRITAIN AND IMPERIALISM

Such an analysis must begin with American attitudes to Britain before the accession of the Labour Party to power. To millions of Americans the words "British" and "imperialism" have become well-nigh inseparable. This is recognised by many Britons. Mr Arthur Creech-Jones, for example, speaks of "an emotional undercurrent pretty deep in American life, which no amount of rational argument seems to eradicate". It is fashionable here to attribute this trend in opinion to 1776 and the Revolutionary War, but it is hardly necessary to look for such remote origins. The friends of Ireland, India and now Palestine have in turn waged large-scale campaigns for American financial and moral support under the battle-cry, "British Imperialism!", and their work has left a permanent impression. It is quite evident that President Roosevelt shared this common American attitude.

American attitudes towards Russia also enter the picture. During the war the entire propaganda machine of the American government worked overtime building up friendship for Russia. It was repeatedly pointed out that Russian policy had always been favourable to the United States; indeed, during the Civil War, Russia had supported the North, while the British Government had given encouragement to the South. There was developed a good-will towards Russia which (while perhaps less spontaneous than that in England, since America had not been in any danger of invasion and defeat) was nevertheless tremendous. In fact, the retention and use of this good-will was a large factor in the policy Mr Earl Browder unsuccessfully advocated for the American Communist Party.

THE LABOUR VICTORY

No event since the end of World War II has aroused such widespread enthusiasm in America as the quite unexpected victory of the Labour Party.

It came close for a moment to shaking the firm devotion of the American left to reformism, rather than socialism; particularly as it came at a time when it was increasingly evident that the reformist policies of the New Deal had left the key positions of the American economy in the hands of its enemies, positions from which they now were threatening a return to power. Labour victory seemed to assure the further development of friendly relations among Russia, Britain and the United States, and there was a firm expectation that Labour would make a sharp, if not a total, break with the policies of imperialism.

These hopes were quickly dashed. Mr Attlee announced that Britain intended to retain Hong Kong, whose possession by Britain has always seemed indefensible to Americans. Violent arguments broke out between Mr Ernest Bevin and the representatives of the U S S R. Mr R. H. S. Crossman has often suggested that Russian policy for the first year after the war was directed primarily against the British Empire and the British Commonwealth, in order to capitalise on the widespread American antipathy to British imperialism. Whether this be true or not (and there is no intention here to pass judgment on a controversy within the ranks of the Labour Party) there is no doubt that many Americans came to regard British imperial interests as an obstacle to friendship between America and the U S S R. Events in Greece and Indonesia contributed to this impression. Britain and the U S S R seemed constantly to be on opposite ends of the diplomatic see-saw, with America wavering in the middle, and often (as at Moscow in December, 1945) throwing her weight towards the Russian side.

The leading exponent of this view was Mr Henry Wallace. In speeches delivered from one end of the United States to the other he denounced " British imperialism ", and urged that " American democracy " serve as the mediator between " Russian Communism " and " British Imperialism ". It is characteristic of British misunderstanding of this almost painfully sincere American that " Critic " of *The New Statesman and Nation* should have described the repetition of this view at Madison Square Garden as " good demagogy ".

It is important to realise that this view, in one form or another, was held by Americans of many different political outlooks. The suggestion of Dr Nicholas Murry Butler, elder statesman of the Republican Party, that America should take the lead in awarding the Dardanelles to Russia, did not waken many echoes among his comrades. The view that America should not have given unqualified backing to Britain on the Trieste issue (should, for example, at the least have offered some such compromise as M Bidault eventually did) was more widely held, notably by the Republican Senator Aiken. Many Americans were of the opinion that Britain was finished as a world power and that her views, where they seemed to conflict with those of Russia, should be disregarded, on practical grounds if on no others.

There was likewise a strong emotional tendency to show friendship to Russia by displaying hostility to Britain, just as there was tendency among other, and much smaller, left-wing groups to combine friendship for Britain with hostility to the U S S R. A notable case in point was Mr Ralph Ingersoll, former editor of *P M*. Mr Ingersoll, of course, has his mirror images in Britain, and it is one of the ironies of the contemporary scene that they are his bitterest critics.

ZIONISTS AND COMMUNISTS

No account of American public opinion would be complete if it did not discuss the role of interest groups. During the period of office of the Labour Government two interest groups have been particularly active in creating an American public opinion adverse to it; the American Zionists and the American Communist Party.

As Professor Laski has recently stated, it would be a grave mistake for Britons to belittle the depth and sincerity of American support for Zionism. There is in the United States a Jewish community numbering five millions, by far the largest and most prosperous Jewish community on the face of the earth. The great majority of these people have close family ties with Europe, and particularly with Germany and Poland. The tragic holocaust which struck the Jews of Europe hit American Jews very hard. Before World War II the Zionists were in a minority; now public opinion polls show they command the support of 90 per cent. of American Jews. In relation to their numbers, Jews (typically public-spirited) are far more active than other minorities in progressive and trades union organisations. Their associates in these organisations have a high regard for them, and what they say carries much weight. British people are well aware of the violence of American Zionist attacks upon England, often through full-page newspaper advertisements. Like their Irish and Indian predecessors, American Zionists may well feel that the best way to get action from England is to make as much trouble for her as possible.

Less violent, but perhaps in some ways more effective, is the propaganda campaign carried on by the American Communist Party and its friends. In the United States, where the Party claims a membership approaching 100,000, hardly more than a thousand people (mostly paid officials) identify themselves publicly with the movement. There is every reason to believe that Communists regret this state of affairs, but it does give them great advantages. Unlike the Zionists, they can put propaganda forward through many different channels, without revealing its interested origin. Thus, in 1940, a whole battery of " front " organisations and publications were busy denouncing anyone favouring aid to England as " an agent of British imperialism ". Now the view is that the British Empire is " one of the greatest enslavers of human beings ". In line with this policy, the " Win-the-Peace Conference " of last spring took action on the proposed loan to Britain; far from objecting to the conditions actually imposed, it resolved to demand an additional one—that none of the money be used for the oppression of colonial peoples.

FRIENDS OF LABOUR BRITAIN

After the recital of these facts, one may well wonder whether the Labour Government has any friends at all among progressive Americans. The fact is, it has a great many. As so often in America, the smoke is out of all proportion to the fire. This became crystal clear in the Congressional vote on the loan to Britain; in spite of all the furore raised by interest groups in opposition, virtually every progressive member of Congress voted for the loan. The amendment demanded by the "Win-the-Peace Conference" was not even introduced. So eminent a Zionist as Rabbi Stephen Wise gave the loan his support.

The difficulties so far mentioned should be transitional in character. The basic factors uniting progressive Americans with Labour are far more enduring. The devotion of the American people to democratic rights (in spite of occasional tragic lapses in the more backward regions of the South) is deep and genuine. This means that American progressives must effect the needed social and economic changes through democratic means, just as the Labour Government must. In the period of the New Deal, British people, then under a Conservative Government, watched the American experiment with keen interest. Now American progressives, temporarily out of power, have much to learn from Britain. As issues such as Palestine move towards solution, there will be growing attention for England's domestic programme, and an increasing tendency to put English experience to use in America.

Believing that facts are the first essentials, the Union for Democratic Action[1] has established a London Bureau to observe the progress of the Labour Government and the Labour Party, and to provide regular reports to American liberals and trades unionists. This Bureau has been at work for the past eight months. It has published a " London Letter " twice each month, which goes to a long list of what Americans call " opinion formers "—leaders in government, labour, minority communities, the churches, and so on. Through a trades union press agency covering over 100 American labour journals—A F L, C I O, and independent—news and comment has gone out to large numbers of trades unionists. In January a leading Labour M P—Mr P. C. Gordon-Walker—toured the Eastern part of the United States under U D A auspices, and it is hoped he will be the first of a number to do so. The Bureau has also placed its resources at the disposal of leading American progressives as they have, from time to time, visited Britain.

The more interchange of this sort takes place, the better. In particular it is a pleasure to note that Mr. Wallace will visit England in April. As " Critic " remarks, he has had " little opportunity of studying British politics at first hand " and should have a most pleasant and instructive visit.

A GREAT WOMAN

The Labour movement has lost much in losing Ellen Wilkinson. She was a brilliant creature, a flame-like spirit giving life and light to thousands. She had one of the quickest and surest minds I have ever met. Often and often when I was slowly and laboriously puzzling out some matter, I have found that Ellen had leapt instantaneously to the heart of the problem. Action followed thought with the same lightness, swiftness, without a shadow of calculation whether this or that would be to her own personal advancement. Such thoughts were foreign to her; indeed, too foreign; for she was careless of her own health as of her own career. She had an instinct for the big thing, and it was the thing that absorbed her, whether she was leading the unemployed or flying to Germany at the last free election to make at least a gesture of solidarity to our hard-pressed German comrades. And now she is lost to us, just when opportunity had come. After long years of uphill fighting, she shared Socialist power for a few brief months, but enough to prove her merits as an administrator. There were faint-hearted people who thought we couldn't raise the school age now. But I never doubted that in spite of all the frightful obstacles—want of teachers and want of buildings—I never doubted that Ellen would find a way, and she did, where a weaker Minister might well have shrunk from all the lions in the path.

Our Labour movement is a shrewd judge of character; and they all have realised Ellen's courage, her sincerity and her services. But one thing they cannot know—what she was as a friend. Those who did, and there are many of them, will remember her as the kindest and most generous friend that any one ever had the good fortune to possess.

A. Susan Lawrence.

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[1] Recently reorganized, under the title " Americans for Democratic Action ", it includes as officers and members many persons prominent in the New Deal, and in trades union and progressive organizations.

BRITISH POLICY IN GREECE

by Tom McKitterick

Tom McKitterick served as an Intelligence Officer with Greek Forces in the Middle East and later on the staff of British Headquarters in Athens.

THE BACKGROUND

In Greece, as in other occupied countries, the effect of German occupation was to bring to the front three trends of opinion. The first, opposed both to Communism and to the Western type of democracy, hoped to utilise the German occupation to eliminate any possibility of a re-emergence of either of these systems. The second, opposed both to the Germans and to Communism, aimed at resistance to the former and the ultimate restoration of the political system which had existed before the Metaxas dictatorship. The third saw in the occupation and in the eventual liberation the opportunity to carry out a far-reaching social revolution in which not only the occupation forces but also the old system with its corruption and inefficiency would be swept away. Common opposition to the Germans rendered possible a partial alliance between the second and third, but such unity as was found could not overcome the fundamental difference of aim; on the other hand common opposition to Communism brought about a certain cohesion between the first and second, so that, especially in the later stages, the boundary between the quisling forces and resistance groups such as that of Zervas was less clear than the division between either of these and the resistance movement of the Left.

The second trend was represented mainly by the exile government and the resistance groups which owed allegiance to it; these, relying chiefly on British support, looked forward to the liberation simply as the restoration to power of the restricted political class which had governed the country for some seventy years until Metaxas swept it aside. Based on the traditional political parties, it had offered little opposition to Metaxas, and was not sufficiently grounded in popular support to be able to give a strong lead to a movement of resistance to the Germans. The third trend was from the start dominated by the Communist Party which, though small, had none the less maintained intact an underground organisation during the period of the dictatorship. While determined to get rid of the Germans, it still saw no reason why it should do so merely to restore the power of a class to which it owed no particular loyalty; and when from time to time this movement of the Left was accused of being more interested in setting up its own form of government than in actually fighting the Germans, it replied with some reason that that was also true of the exile government and of Zervas.

When the occupation ended, the Left, organised as the National Liberation Front, or E A M, was in control of nearly the whole of the country. A superficial unity with the exile government had been brought about earlier in the summer of 1944 by the admission of six E A M representatives to the government in Cairo, but it was clear from the first that there was no real unity of purpose. E A M did not intend to surrender its control without a struggle; Papandreou and his British supporters realised equally soon that the authority of Athens could only be extended to the country either by capitulating to E A M or by force; and since they were not prepared to capitulate force was used in December 1944 and the physical control which E A M had exercised passed

into the hands of its political opponents. The two movements differed not only in their conception of internal government, but also in their international outlook. While the traditional parties looked southwards, regarding Greece as a primarily Mediterranean Power relying as in the past on British support, E A M from the start took a more " Balkan " view, and being a movement under Communist influence, drew much of its inspiration from the Soviet Union. Thus British support for the exile government and British intervention in the civil war were dictated primarily by the strategic object of retaining Greece within the British sphere of influence; E A M was eliminated not so much because it was a revolutionary movement as because it was a pro-Russian movement, and a Greece controlled by it would by implication be a Greece within a Russian sphere, and so contrary to traditional British policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.

What little Centre had survived the occupation was almost completely destroyed by the civil war. Each side was forced into a " he that is not with us is against us " attitude, and even a good many traditional republicans were compelled by their fear of E A M to close their ranks with the monarchists and the extreme Right. The successive British-inspired governments which followed, from Plastiras to Sofoulis, were well-meaning attempts to recreate a centre or even a " moderate Left ", but were doomed to failure in the absence of the necessary conditions for a Centre; once the administrative machinery of E A M was destroyed, control of the country passed to the extreme Right no matter what the complexion of the Athens government. The Sofoulis government alone showed signs of willingness to improve this state of affairs, but over a year after the civil war Sofoulis himself complained bitterly that in every attempt he made to remove the less desirable officers who had come into positions of authority after the civil war he had to meet the persistent opposition of the British Military Mission. Meanwhile little was done to tackle the urgent problems of economic reconstruction; the scene was dominated by political disputes, and perhaps the biggest condemnation of the policy followed is that now, more than two years after the liberation, Greece has made less progress than other countries towards the rebuilding of her shattered economy. The elections of March 1946 were doubtless fair by Greek standards; the objection to them is that they were held after fifteen months of " conditioning " of the electorate and on wholly irrelevant issues. Thus at the present time the country remains profoundly divided between two extremes with virtually no Centre, and the only form of government which is practically possible is government by one extreme or the other.

THE POLICY

Britain still bears a great responsibility for what happens in Greece, and it will be generally agreed that her policy must be devised in the light of two paramount requirements. In the first place, she should encourage the formation and maintenance of a government acceptable to as large a section of the population as possible. In the second place, Britain must not herself pursue, or encourage any Greek Government to pursue, a policy liable to disturb the general peace. The difficulty of the present situation lies in the fact that these two requirements are only partly capable of reconciliation.

It is still commonly believed in this country that it would be possible to bring the Greek Government more into line with the wishes of the people either by broadening the basis of the present monarchist government to include groups standing to the left of it such as the Sofoulis Liberals, or by establishing in its place a new " Government of National Unity " including E A M. Both these proposals deserve examination. It is not so commonly understood, however, that even if the Sofoulis Liberals were included the government

would still be little more acceptable to E A M; the gulf between the Liberals and E A M is vastly greater than the gap between the Liberals and the Populists, since both the latter are within the framework of the traditional parties against which E A M revolted. Even if the government were so broadened, it would still be unable, even if it were willing, effectively to change the character of the administration through which rather than through the government itself the Right at present exercises its influence. The same objection holds against a purely Centre government; what little Centre exists could perhaps form a government, but again could not capture the administration. A government of national unity, though an attractive proposition, is not now within the bounds of practical politics; it proved unworkable in 1944, and there is now even less unity of aim than there was then. Conditions are now such that the only practicable alternatives are the continuance of a government on the present lines, or its overthrow and replacement by a government based on E A M; yet each would be bitterly opposed by important sections of public opinion.

A state approaching civil war already exists, and if the present government continues the situation is bound to deteriorate further. On the other hand, a government of E A M could hardly be brought into being without a civil war, and opposition to it would be so intense that it could only govern by dictatorial means. Our first requirement would not be fully satisfied by either of these alternatives, but it must be recognised that a democratic solution is possible only when there exists at least some basis for community of aim or action; the absence of such a basis is the chief legacy of the events of the last two and a half years. If then from the point of view of the first requirement the choice is one between two evils, the problem must be examined in the light of the second requirement.

Both the expansionist tradition of the old parties and the belief (carefully stimulated in Athens to divert attention from internal sources of trouble) that E A M is supported from over the northern frontiers make the Greek Right bitterly anti-Slav, and lead it to place in the forefront of its programme territorial claims against Greece's neighbours. Innumerable ethnographic and strategic arguments are adduced to support these claims, but the basis for them remains one of prestige; Bulgaria has been defeated in war, therefore she must surrender territory to the victor. But one result of the changed system in Bulgaria and Jugoslavia has been the elimination of the traditional hostility between those two countries, and it may not be long till they, and perhaps Albania, combine in a single federal unit, which would have the moral backing of the Soviet Union. Consequently a claim against any northern neighbour is now a claim against a very powerful group; and if the present state of affairs continues in Greece, it will be only a matter of time till the counter-claims of Bulgaria to an Aegean outlet, and perhaps even a Jugoslav claim to Salonika, are pressed. The northern frontier of Greece is thus a danger point, all the more so since it now divides not small states but the East and the West themselves. E A M on the other hand, though it has not been fully consistent on the territorial question, would clearly be more likely to come to an understanding with the neighbouring states, and so eliminate this danger spot from the map. From the point of view of the second requirement, a government of the Left would certainly be preferable.

While British troops remain in Greece the Right will regard their presence as tantamount to approval of its internal and foreign policy; not only will there be no moderation inside the country, but the territorial claims will continue to be pressed in the belief (held by many people of the Right) that an Anglo-Russian war is not only inevitable but desirable. Internally this policy can only lead to civil war. The longer British forces remain, the greater the likelihood of their being once more involved in a civil war, and there can

be little doubt that if they were overt intervention from the neighbouring countries would soon follow. The international consequences of such a clash can be easily imagined. One may therefore conclude that neither the maintenance of the present government not the continued presence of British troops answers the second requirement; both are liable to disturb the general peace.

In a short article it is not possible to examine fully the strategic value of Greece to Britain. But it should be remarked that the experience of 1941 showed that Greece cannot be held against attack from the north without very large forces; in the event of a war between Britain and Russia an attack in the Balkans would clearly come almost immediately, and if Greece were to be held these large forces would have to be already in place. Whatever strategic advantage there might be in maintaining an army there permanently, or even in supporting a pro-British government, is more than offset by the danger that such a policy would make the outbreak of war more likely.

CONCLUSION

A situation has now been reached where a democratic solution is not possible, and continued outside intervention is highly dangerous to the general peace of Europe. The strategic value of Greece to Britain is more than outweighed by the political dangers of trying to maintain a position there. Sooner or later the Greeks must settle their problems themselves; the continued presence of foreign troops leads merely to a perpetuation of tension. A clash between Left and Right seems inevitable; the only permissible policy is to ensure as far as possible that when it comes it does not lead to catastrophic international consequences.

LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND THE COMMUNITY

by Peter Self and "Administrator"

Peter Self, B A (Oxford) is on the editorial staff of the "Economist". He has worked for the Nuffield Social Reconstruction Survey in London and lectures for the W E A in economics and politics. He has made a special study of problems of Town Planning and Local Government, about which he has written in a number of places, including a previous issue of "Fabian Quarterly".

"Administrator" was the author of a previous article on Local Government which appeared in "Fabian Quarterly", October 1945.

How much interest does the general public take in local government? The answer is well known to be not very much. But this answer is founded only on general impressions. Singularly little is known or tabulated about the number of seats that are contested in local elections or the number of electors who go to the polls in the different areas. Even the bare facts as to how far the local electors show their interest in the simplest and most elementary way—namely, by nominating candidates and voting for them—are not readily available; while to get a proper picture of the workings of local government, far more is needed, of course, than the voting figures. Once a local council has been elected, how much attention is paid to its proceedings? How many local newspapers are there to give even a summary account of the council's activities? How many papers go further and offer reasoned comment and criticism? Which branches of the council's actions arouse most interest among the public and for what reasons?

The whole subject is one in which it is easy from the outset to get lost in a wilderness of unanswered questions; yet it has a peculiar importance at the present time. The status and the character of local government is being rapidly transformed, as powers are handed from one class to another class of local authorities, as other functions are whipped completely out of local government control, as local areas are changed and amended, and as the routine decisions of the Town Hall become increasingly guided by supervision from Whitehall. At the moment so many piecemeal changes are taking place that the net effect is rather like the transformation scene in a pantomime. The local government system of the future has still to emerge and, before it does so, some of the existing types of local authority will probably be disbanded and new kinds of local authority may appear on the scene.

FOUR SAMPLE AREAS

It is a commonplace that, in planning for the future, account should be taken of the lessons of the past. There is an urgent need to scrutinise the dissolving scheme of local government in order to try and spot its defects. In particular it would be valuable to contrast the experience of different areas, and to see how far the strength and the vigour of political activity varies for the different classes of local authority. This article is concerned with the results of an investigation into the election returns for local authorities in four sample areas, Cambridgeshire, Nottingham, Devonshire and the West

Riding of Yorkshire. All types of local authorities in these areas, except the parish, have been investigated. The four areas taken together contain four administrative counties, 13 county boroughs, 26 municipal boroughs, 146 urban districts and 57 rural districts. The only substantial industrial area of the four is the West Riding, which contains no less than 167 of the 246 local authorities of all sorts that these areas contain. The West Riding contains all but three of the county boroughs and four-fifths of the urban districts. By contrast Cambridgeshire possesses no more than five local authorities, the county, the non-county borough of Cambridge and three rural districts. Devonshire is also mainly rural, although it is a large and varied county. There are two well-contrasted county boroughs, Exeter and Plymouth, a number of ancient ports and market towns of small population holding the status of municipal boroughs together with several much more populous holiday resorts holding the lower status of urban districts. Nottingham is a smaller county containing one important county borough and a few industrialised non-county boroughs and urban districts.

Thus these four counties are a reasonably well-assorted quartet, containing a balanced blend of town and countryside, industrial area and dormitory suburb, and exhibiting too all the anomalies of a local government structure under which it is historical accident no less than population or importance which determines whether a sizeable town shall be a county borough, a non-county borough, or an urban district. These characteristics and anomalies have to be borne in mind when attempting any deductions from the figures that follow.

The investigation covered the six years, 1933–39, immediately before the war. During this period there were two complete re-elections of the county councils, in 1934 and 1937, and six annual elections to the other authorities at which a proportion of the council was changed. Altogether, therefore, the period witnessed two complete re-elections of each council. Unfortunately, however, the election returns are far from complete. One difficulty was that the Local Government Act, 1933, and the Urban and Rural District Council Election Rules permitted, or rather instructed, local returning officers to destroy the election documents six months after the date of election—an arrangement hardly calculated to lessen the obscurity which envelops the affairs of local government. In some areas, air raids have destroyed election records while in others the responsible officials either would not or could not supply the information desired. Wherever possible, the gaps in information have been filled from the files of local newspapers.

In the end, election returns were obtained for 178 of the 249 authorities in the four sample counties. However, for many of these 178 authorities the analysis is incomplete, some years having to be left blank. This makes it difficult to give a satisfactory statistical summary of the results. In Tables II and III, the unit of calculation is not the authority, but the election. The Tables compare the results of 8 county council elections, 77 county borough elections, 131 non-county borough elections, 390 urban district elections and 63 rural district elections. The authorities whose returns are incomplete will have contributed a smaller number of elections to the pool than the other authorities. These omissions, which cannot be avoided, are only serious in the case of the rural districts.

As far as county boroughs are concerned, all but one of the 78 elections held in the 13 county boroughs during the six-year period have been included. The full returns for both elections held in the four county councils during this period are also available. Table I is intended to offset the statistical anonymity of the subsequent Tables by giving figures for a few actual authorities for the years 1934 and 1937, the years of the two county council elections. Besides the four counties and four typical county boroughs, one non-county

borough and one urban district has been selected alphabetically from each of the four sample areas, and four rural districts have been taken from the West Riding (the only area possessing adequate returns for rural districts.)

Table I is given by way of illustration only. No real importance can be attached to the averages given in it, as they are derived from so small a number of authorities.

TABLE I

DIVISIONS CONTESTED AND VOTES CAST IN SOME TYPICAL LOCAL AREAS

	No. of Councillors	*No. of Divisions*	*Divisions contested* 1934	*Divisions contested* 1937	*Divisions contested* 1934 %	*Divisions contested* 1937 %	*Total votes cast* 1934 %	*Total votes cast* 1937 %
COUNTIES :								
Cambridge ..	51	51	9	8	18	16	12·6	7·4
Devon	84	84	7*	11	8*	13	†	5·5
West Riding ..	91	91	46	32	50	35	21·6	14·1
Nottingham ..	64	64	28	30	44	47	26·1	16·9
County Average	—	—	—	—	30	28	20·1	11·0
COUNTY BOROUGHS:								
Exeter	51	17	5	9	30	53	26·4	41·0
Plymouth ..	63	21	9	18	43	86	24·6	40·2
Nottingham ..	48	16	14	11	87	70	36·3	31·9
Sheffield.. ..	75	25	19	16	76	64	38·3	28·6
C.B. Average ..	—	—	—	—	59	68	31·4	35·4
NON-COUNTY BOROUGHS:								
Cambridge ..	42	12	1	6	8	50	2.2	19·3
Barnstaple ..	18	2	2	2	100	100	40·0	44·3
East Retford ..	18	3	0	2	0	67	Nil	37·2
Batley	24	5	1	1	20	20	7·2	9·4
M.B. Average ..	—	—	—	—	32	59	12·3	27·5
URBAN DISTRICTS:								
Ashburton ..	12	12	12	12	100	100	28·9	33·6
Arnold	15	15	15	15	100	100	38·0	39·8
Adwich-Le-Street	12	4	3	1	75	25	45·0	10·7
Baildon	12	4	1	3	25	75	13·6	50·6
U.D. Average ..	—	—	—	—	75	75	31·6	43·7
RURAL DISTRICTS:								
Kiveton Park ..	21	11	4	4	36	36	43·4	42·4
Hemsworth ..	37	24	23	12	96	50	33·8	15·6
Rotherham ..	30	17	9	12	53	70	36·2	45·0
Sedbergh ..	14	4	0	2	0	50	Nil	30·8
R.D. Average	—	—	—	—	46	51	37·6	33·4

* In 1934, Devon had only 65 electoral divisions.
† Figure not available.

Despite the imperfections of their statistical make-up, Tables II and III do provide a guide to the extent to which political energy varied between the several categories of local authority. Tables II and III relate to the same series of elections, which occurred between 1933 and 1939, except that Table III includes a few extra elections for rural district councils only. Table IV relates to the first post-war elections in a small number of local authorities and is on a different basis from Table III. All these tables need careful interpretation, which will be given subsequently.

TABLE II. CONTESTED SEATS, 1933–39

Percentage of contested seats	*County Boroughs*		*Administrative Counties*		*Non-County Boroughs*		*Urban Districts*		*Rural Districts*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Nil					9	6·9	43	11·0	8	12·7
0·1– 10			1	12.5	1	·8	1	·3	7	11·1
10·1– 20	1	1·3	3	37·5	4	3·1	10	2·6	18	28·6
20·1– 30	3	3·9			7	5·3	21	5·4	11	17·5
30·1– 40	6	7·8	1	12·5	14	10·7	36	9·2	7	11·1
40·1– 50	6	7·8	2	25·0	16	12·2	31	7·9	4	6·4
50·1– 60	9	11·7	1	12·5	2	1·5	17	4·4	2	3·1
60·1– 70	10	13·0			10	7·6	19	4·9	2	3·1
70·1– 80	12	15·6			14	10·7	35	8·9	1	1·6
80·1– 90	13	16·8			6	4·6	10	2·6		
90·1–100	17	22·1			48	36·6	167	42·8	3	4·8
Total No. of Elections	77		8		131		390		63	

TABLE III. ELECTORAL POLLS, 1933–39.

Percentage of Electorate which voted	*County Boroughs*		*Administrative Counties*		*Non-County Boroughs*		*Urban Districts*		*Rural Districts*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Nil					9	6·9	42	10·7	17	19·0
0·1– 10			2	28·6	10	7·7	13	3·3	27	30·0
10·1– 20	4	5·2	3	42·8	19	14·6	64	16·3	23	25·5
20·1– 30	20	26·0	2	28·6	21	16·2	101	26·3	14	15·5
30·1– 40	20	26·0			21	16·2	81	20·7	5	5·5
40·1– 50	18	23·3			23	16·9	41	10·5	4	4·5
50·1– 60	9	11·7			13	10·0	26	6·6		
60·1– 70	3	3·9			14	10·7	17	4·3		
70·1– 80	3	3·9					3	·8		
80·1– 90							2	·5		
90·1–100					1	·8				
Total No. of Elections	77		8		131		390		90	

TABLE IV. ELECTORAL POLLS (POST-WAR)

Percentage of Electorate which voted	*County Boroughs*		*Administrative Counties*		*Non-County Boroughs*		*Urban Districts*		*Rural Districts*	
	No.	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*	*No.*	*%*
Nil							2	3·8	1	5·0
0·1– 10										
10·1– 20			1	14·3						
20·1– 30	1	5·0	3	42·8	1	1·9				
30·1– 40	1	5·0	3	42·8	10	19·0	3	5·8	3	15·0
40·1– 50	12	60·0			15	28·3	15	28·9	5	25·0
50·1– 60	4	20·0			13	24·5	24	46·1	6	30·0
60·1– 70	1	5·0			12	22·6	7	13·5	3	15·0
70·1– 80	1	5·0			2	3·7	1	1·9	2	10·0
80·1– 90										
90·1–100										
Total No. of Elections	20		7		53		50		19	

UNCONTESTED SEATS

The most depressing feature of local government is the large number of electoral divisions in which there is not even a contest. Table II suggests that at the average pre-war election, it was much more the exception than the rule for contests to occur in the average administrative county or rural district. The detailed figures for the four county councils given in Table I show that, of the 51 divisions in Cambridgeshire, only 9 were contested in 1934 and only 8 in 1937. The situation was if anything worse in Devon. In these two counties, the great majority of county councillors were returned unopposed, no challenger exerting the energy to come forward. Competition was much keener in the West Riding and Nottinghamshire, although there was no County Council election in which over half of the seats were contested. The situation seems to have been very similar in rural district council elections, for two-thirds of which the proportion of contested seats was less than one-third. The situation was a good deal better in urban areas, although the numbers of councillors returned unopposed was unhealthily large. For instance, in 7 per cent. of non-county borough elections and in 11 per cent. of urban district elections, not a single contest took place in any electoral division. On the other hand, it is worth noting that in well over a third of both non-county borough and urban district elections, over 90 per cent. of the seats were contested. The figures for county borough elections are much more stable than for these other two types of urban authorities. In most county borough elections, an appreciable number of councillors were returned unopposed, but only at one-fifth of the elections was this proportion higher than one-half.

FEW CONTESTS MEAN LOW POLLS

Table III shows what proportion of the electorate voted in much the same series of elections. Its results largely reflect those of Table II for the reason that, when a seat is not contested, there is no opportunity for the elector to vote. In areas where there are few contests, the poll is inevitably extremely low. Table III shows that not a single county council election analysed mustered

a poll of over 30 per cent. The polling for rural district councils was a little, but not very much, higher and was well below the average volume of urban voting. The polling at county borough elections was mainly concentrated in a sector of from 20 to 50 per cent. and that at urban district elections in a lower sector running from 10 to 40 per cent. The proportion voting was more evenly spread out in the case of non-county borough elections. On the whole, polling was higher in the county boroughs than in the non-county boroughs, and higher in the non-county boroughs than in the urban districts. This Table also illustrates how very rare is a poll of over 80 per cent. in local elections.

Before any comment is offered on these figures, it may be interesting to append a further Table, giving the results of the first elections held since the end of the war. These results cover a rather different range of authorities from those treated in the first three Tables and Devonshire is excluded. In addition, Table IV deals only with the voting in those wards in which contests actually took place. It expresses the poll as a proportion not of the total local electorate but of those local electors who were given the opportunity to cast a vote. For these reasons, it is not comparable with Table III. It is more interesting, however, as it shows better how much enthusiasm there is to cast a vote, given the chance.

The administrative counties come off even worse than usual and are clearly shown to be the councils for which polling is lowest. The rural districts, however, emerge surprisingly well and actually contain the highest proportion of authorities in the top flight of polling. The county borough polls are mainly concentrated between 40 and 50 per cent., whereas the urban districts are bunched between 50 and 60 per cent.—higher this time than the county boroughs. The non-county boroughs are spread out more evenly and come off rather less well than the urban districts. No poll exceeds 80 per cent., even of the reduced electorate analysed in this Table.

THE MALAISE OF RURAL AREAS

These Tables are too imperfect statistically and too subject to chance variations (especially Table IV) to serve as the basis for any sweeping assertions. But they are at least suggestive in a number of directions. It is clear, in the first place, that the number of seats contested in rural areas is exceptionally and alarmingly small. Considering only county council elections, the mainly rural counties—Devonshire and Cambridgeshire—showed a very much smaller proportion of contests than an area like the West Riding, where there are an appreciable proportion of industrial and urban workers. The reason would seem to be that, in agricultural areas, the political tutelage of the squirearchy and gentry is still unchallenged so far as local government is concerned. The Labour movement, which is making headway among farmers and farm workers over national issues, has not aroused their interest to much extent in local politics. Moreover, the tenant farmer and the farm worker—especially, of course, the latter—have neither the time or the means to stand for election to the county council or the rural district council, except under conditions of great difficulty. It is almost unknown to find a farm worker on a county council. Even if he could obtain permission to attend the meetings, he would have to undertake a long journey at his own expense to do so. In areas where agriculture is the only important industry, historical and social traditions are still too strong for local government to be considered the concern of the ordinary people.

On the other hand, the Tables do not furnish conclusive evidence that—where contests do take place in rural areas—public interest in the result is appreciably lower than in the towns, bearing in mind that various special factors, such as weather and distances, make polling harder in the countryside.

In some areas the very fact that a local government contest is a rare event may stimulate the public's interest. What the Tables do seem to suggest is that polling is normally higher for the rural district council than for the county council, and this advantage is increased if uncontested seats are excluded. On any method of calculation, the county council election seems to attract much less interest than any other type of local authority election.

WHAT'S WRONG WITH THE COUNTY COUNCIL?

This tendency needs some explaining. It cannot be attributed purely to the rural factor, since rural districts are far more homogeneously rural than are the counties. It cannot be attributed to any lack of importance of the county council's functions, which are wider and more significant than those possessed by rural and urban districts. The present trend is to load the counties with powers previously administered by the smaller authorities and to give them greater powers of control and supervision over the county districts. The latest examples are the transfer of education and town and country planning powers to the county councils, leaving the county district councils in a very junior position. The county's new-found authority in the preparation of planning schemes and the control of land use is of especial importance.

This rise in the status of the county council makes it all the more important to discover, and to remedy, the causes of public apathy over county council elections. Some possible causes of apathy are fairly familiar. The county council meets rarely and involves a longer and far more troublesome journey than the meetings of other councils. It seems more remote and therefore less interesting to the ordinary citizen than does his local council. Its elections are less frequent. Traditionally, in many areas, it has been dominated by a clique whom it is hard to unseat. Traditionally, too, there seems to have been an unwritten law in certain counties to dispense with active canvassing for county council elections. All these are partial explanations, but it is doubtful if they are sufficient. It is possible that a local government system, which has progressively detached the administration of all the important towns from the administration of their surrounding suburbs and rural areas, has quite a bit to do with the situation. The puzzled elector in county areas, faced with units of local government that seem unreal and arbitrary and required to elect two or (counting the parish) three authorities, has preferred to stand or to vote—if at all—for the authority which is nearest to him and which meets and holds elections most frequently.

As far as urban areas are concerned, the Tables suggest that the county boroughs have the most stable record of local political activity. The record of both non-county boroughs and urban districts is far more fluctuating and variable. At some elections of these authorities, there is a low number of contested seats and a very small poll, while at other elections, the opposite is the case. The extremes of public interest and public apathy appear to be demonstrated in non-county borough and urban district elections in a way that is denied to the more staid county boroughs, which excite a more uniform if often tepid interest. This difference is hardly surprising. Some non-county boroughs may still serve to focus the historical interests of an ancient town or port, and excite popular attention accordingly, while urban districts are well-known to be of all sorts—some being politically homogeneous and progressive, others being the merest quiltwork of built-up areas thrown together without a shred of common interest.

The investigation whose results have been analysed in this article does no more than put out a very tentative feeler into largely unexplored territory. It needs to be repeated that it would be unwise to draw certain conclusions —even as to the facts of local council elections—from its findings. It does,

however, offer confirmation of three urgent needs of local government reform. One is that the town and the countryside need to be much better and more closely integrated for local government purposes. Only by this means can the political lifelessness of the average agricultural area be overcome. Another is that the councillor should (as is now suggested) be paid his full expenses and, even more important, that his right to stand for election and without any loss of prestige or of earnings in his work should be explicitly recognised by employers. A third need is to pay special attention to the position of the counties, and to review their distinctive rôles and traditions in the light of their failure to command the public's interest. This investigation further suggests that the three-tier system prevailing in county areas is too big and unwieldy a dose of local democracy for the public to swallow. It also seems highly likely that public interest in local government cannot be aroused without completely overhauling the existing system of areas and functions.

CORRESPONDENCE

LOCATION OF INDUSTRY

To the Editor,
Fabian Quarterly.

Sir,

In his article entitled " The Distribution of Industry and New Towns " in your December issue, Mr Gilbert McAllister, M P, cites the transfer by Stewarts and Lloyds of their works from Mossend, Lanarkshire, to Corby, Northamptonshire, as an example of arbitrary planning, and a refutation of the contention of professional economists that " industries were located by ..... some incidence of raw materials, and so on ". Mr McAllister is unfortunate in his choice of an example of arbitrary planning, since it was precisely what the economists contend, viz., the existence of raw materials (iron ore suitable for the manufacture of steel by the Bessemer process) that determined the location of the Corby Works.

In this case the location of the industry was the key to town planning. The new industry caused a new town to be built for the accommodation of the workers uprooted from Mossend, Rutherglen and the East-end of Glasgow.

Yours truly,

WM. STEWART.

(NOTE : Mr Gilbert McAllister, M P, writes: ' In a sense Mr Stewart is right. In my article I was compressing the argumen There are two aspects of industrial location, one is the question of the site most suitable to the industry and the other is the question of the transfer of workers. Many people have argued in the past that the workers are not willing to be uprooted and even to shift them 20 or 30 miles out of London would be to ask the impossible. The move of Stewarts and Lloyds from Mossend, Lanarkshire, to Corby, Northamptonshire, demonstrated that it was possible to move a whole community from one country to another. The mass migration of workers from Britain to the United States, Canada, Australia and New Zealand between the wars showed that the workers were prepared to move to the end of the earth for economic security and better conditions.")

BOOK REVIEWS

PHILOSOPHY and POLITICAL THEORY

HISTORY OF WESTERN PHILOSOPHY and its connection with Political and Social Circumstances from the Earliest Times to the Present Day By Bertrand Russell (Allen & Unwin, 21/-)

Criticism of the kind which the author forestalls in his modest and disarming preface is the proper concern of philosophers, and perhaps historians; and any attempt to cover so wide a field in less than 900 pages must give the critics considerable scope. The common reader, given a well-justified confidence in the competence of Bertrand Russell to handle his subject, is well content to have here a meditation (a term applicable without apology to philosophical writing) in which serenity and tolerance are added to wisdom and acumen. One wishes that the moderns could have been brought somewhat more fully under review. The only references to Whitehead, for instance, note that he collaborated in the writing of *Principia Mathematica*, and that he has been influenced by Bergson. In view of the comparative severity with which Bergson has been handled (which may be due to the convenient incorporation of a thirty-year-old critique) this might suggest an injustice to Whitehead. But there may be good grounds for omitting a philosophy which cannot yet claim a very widespread influence. From another side, "Existentialism" had not attracted much attention when this book went to print, and might indeed fall among those forms of extreme subjectivism dismissed as "almost insane". Its roots, however, lie well within the period covered, and it has a close connection with the social and political conditions of the time, and the mental atmosphere arising from them.

Armed as he is with logical instruments of deadly precision, Bertrand Russell yet presents the philosophies of the past with sympathy; it overflows from his generous understanding of the human history. He does not separate the thought from the man, and he is tender towards most human failings. (Abelard, whose heterodoxy and misfortunes have won him, in general, an exaggerated reputation, emerges slightly and not unjustly deflated.) Old controversies which in retrospect look ridiculous are treated with insight and seriousness; where irony is employed, it rarely touches the nerve. This makes for appreciative reading. The humour is a kind of concealed lighting: "Abstain from beans!", noted as a recurrent precept of the Pythagoreans, illustrates the development of philosophy into a way of life: the quotation of James Mill's first and last words on Kant, "I see well enough what poor Kant would be at", is almost a complete commentary on the Utilitarians.

The significance attached to his reference of philosophy to the social and political conditions in which it arises is made explicit during a discussion of the materialist conception of history. Allowing that this doctrine of Marx "contains very important elements of truth", he adds, "I am aware that it has influenced my own views of philosophical development as set forth in the present work. "This indebtedness to Marx is certainly not very obvious, and it is further qualified by the deliberate preference for "political" over "economic" to describe the circumstances affecting the philosophy. But the distinction between a philosophy, a more or less self-consistent system centred on "extra-rational decisions", to which the Marxist contention may very closely apply, and philosophy in its purely rational treatment of scientific and logical questions, which is independent of the temperament or the social circumstances of the philosopher, is lucidly drawn. This does not mean, of course, that Bertrand Russell is, or expects to be, exempt from the influence of his own circumstances. Although he is not among the system-makers, but belongs to the austere school of logical analysis, his reflections and judgments are not uncoloured. Dr Dewey's retort, that he might as well link Mr Russell's philosophy to the interests of the English landed aristocracy,

would have had some point if he had referred rather to the better sort of Whig noblemen. A keen-sighted humane liberalism pervades the whole book, and finds expression in some of the remarkable paragraphs with which certain chapters close. They are too many for quotation, but they are eloquent of a spirit that the world cannot afford to quench.

If his liberalism is somewhat out of fashion (and for this liberals must accept their share of blame) so is another element in his philosophy. It is firmly expressed at the close of his examination of the pragmatists. "In all this" (the resurgence of "the sense of the collective power of human communities") "I feel", he writes, "a grave danger, the danger of what might be called cosmic impiety. The concept of "truth" as something dependent upon facts largely outside human control has been one of the ways in which philosophy hitherto has inculcated the necessary element of humility. When this check upon pride is removed, a further step is taken on the road towards a certain kind of madness—the intoxication of power which invaded philosophy with Fichte . . . . I am persuaded that this intoxication is the greatest danger of our time, and that any philosophy which, however unintentionally, contributes to it is increasing the danger of vast social disaster." Those of us who are most anxious to see "the collective power of human communities" controlled and exercised by and for the community cannot afford to allow this kind of consideration to be excluded from our thinking: if this happens it can become the nucleus of forces allied to reaction. It is fortunate that this warning comes from Bertrand Russell.

K. H.

POLITICS AND MORALS By Benedetto Croce (Allen & Unwin 8/6)
STATES AND MORALS By T. D. Weldon (John Murray 9/-)

Here are two books approaching the same subject from different angles. Croce's is a theoretical treatise whilst Weldon's is more clearly related to immediate political problems. Neither makes easy reading.

Croce sets out to tackle the age-old notion that politics and morals do not mix. Politics and the functioning of the moral conscience are two modes of activities equally necessary and eternal. The latter must continually exert a perpetual influence on the former, knocking perpetually at its door. "In this continuous transformation of morals into politics, which still remain politics, lies the real ethical progress of mankind."

Perhaps Weldon's book will have a wider appeal because of its practical application. It is argued that the practice of segregating morals and politics has been disastrous. "Political theories grow out of and give expression to moral beliefs and sentiments" and "no moral doctrine can be seriously estimated without full consideration of the political theory which derives from it." Of particular relevance are the writer's observations on the possibilities of a 'world' or 'super' state. "It can only govern if one set of moral standards is generally accepted. In the absence of any demonstration that one political faith is absolutely superior to the others the idea of a super-state as a voluntary organisation is untenable."

P. J. P.

THE STATE OF THE WORLD By Adam de Hegedus (Jonathan Cape 10/6)

The author argues that although the political and economic problems of world harmony are closely connected they may be separated for purposes of analysis. The political problem lies in superseding the sovereign nation-state, and although it would be better for this to come about by consent alone he does not expect this to happen. But if it is to come about through force this will come more easily and with less suffering if the power using the force gains the partial consent of others by showing that it will respect their cultural independence. On the other side it will be necessary to undermine the prevalent belief that the nation-state is a part of enduring nature and is an absolute end in itself. The writer does not always carry conviction, but his essay is certainly on the right side.

H. L. E.

THE DECLINE OF LIBERALISM AS AN IDEOLOGY By John H. Hallowell (Routledge 12/6)

Although the latter part of this essay is self-limited to German political thinkers it is a very interesting analysis in itself of the way in which " true " liberalism, of which John Locke is the author's chief exemplar, gave way. In Mr Hallowell's view true Liberalism had a two-way approach; it combined emphasis on the individual with emphasis on " eternal truths transcending individuals and independent of either individual will or desire "—what the seventeenth century used to call natural law. When either way of approach is neglected liberalism becomes impossible, and the result is either anarchy or totalitarianism—the difference, in the author's view, not being of very great importance, because in the modern world anarchy must sooner or later mean dictatorship. It was in the nineteenth century, he believes, that the split came, one set of Liberals advocating laissez-faire individualism, and the other Staatsrecht. The result, in Germany, was Hitler's nihilism. What is to come next he does not say; but this is a thought-provoking book for a library.

M. I. C.

INTERNATIONAL

AMERICA'S STAKE IN BRITAIN'S FUTURE By George Soule (Geoffrey Cumberlege Oxford 10/6)

This book, by an American Progressive until recently an editor of the New Republic, might well have its title reversed. Mr Soule believes that unless Britain and America follow compatible economic policies the result will be disastrous, and he well understands the British objection to being exposed to a major American depression. He believes that America must demonstrate her ability to maintain full employment by consuming (directly or indirectly) what she can produce. Beside this virtue such details as the writer's incomplete appreciation of the British case for bulk purchase are negligible. But the logic of the argument leads to the conclusion that we shall lose our stake in economic collaboration unless America socialises her economy. Mr Soule almost gets there; but he cannot say it outright. His understanding book is like a Roosevelt speech before Pearl Harbour, leading to a conclusion that isn't yet there.

H. L. E.

AMERICAN INTERPRETATIONS By David Mitrany (Contact Books 6/–)

THE UNITED STATES AND BRITAIN By Crane Brinton (O U P 9/6)

Here are two contrasts in interpretation of two great powers to each other Professor Mitrany's four political essays are examples of clear thinking, ably expressed through the retailing of the minimum of facts consistent with convincing argument. He is able to look at the aspects of American politics and opinion he discusses in the large, and although all will not agree with all of his conclusions they are very hard to overthrow.

Crane Brinton's book, while purporting to be an examination of Anglo-American relations, is mainly a factual study of Britain at war. Unfortunately, Mr Brinton left England in August 1944 and the change in scene both material and political that has since taken place is not reflected in his writing. The book had the misfortune to be out of date before it emerged from the printing press. If America gains knowledge of Britain from this work it will be of a Britain that has already been superseded. It contributes little to the solution of Anglo-American misunderstanding.

E. D.

MEN, MIND AND POWER By David Abrahamsen (Columbia London Geoffrey Cumberlege 13/6)

This is an attempt by a Norwegian psychiatrist to discover what kinds of minds the Nazi leaders had. He finds their behaviour similar in various ways

to that of socially maladjusted persons he has had to treat in his professional experience. Although he, of course, does not have first-hand evidence, his comments carry reasonable conviction. But how did such types come to be accepted so widely in Germany ? The author's answer needs supplementing by that of the sociologist and the political historian, and he tends on occasion to press a point rather far. His most interesting recommendation for the future is that, in so far as the German tendency to be unduly submissive before authority and too domineering over inferiors may be traced back to habits learned in the home, much might be done by encouraging German women to greater economic and mental independence.

H. L. E.

42 DAYS IN THE SOVIET UNION By John Parker, M P (Wells Gardner 1946 5/-)

I combed this book for possible mistakes with the natural avidity of one who spent two and a quarter years in the Soviet Union That I could find practically none is a tribute first to the care taken by Mr Parker, who has avoided the temptation to read generalisations into much of what he saw, and secondly to the quite exceptional facilities which the Soviet authorities gave to the Parliamentary Delegation in 1945. Mr Parker is mistaken about the school leaving age, which is twelve and not seventeen. Some responsibilities for further education are involved whenever possible, even when a child leaves school at the age of twelve, which in cities is probably quite rare. This accounts for the differing answers one may get about the years of compulsory education.

W. W. M.

RUSSIA'S NEIGHBOUR—THE NEW POLAND By Bernard Newman (Gollancz 1946 12/6)

Half of Mr Newman's book is devoted—rightly enough—to the old Poland, and though most of his facts are elementary enough, one could wish that knowledge of many of them were more widespread. Mr Newman was apparently one of the first foreign journalists to visit the new Poland for any period. He spoke on Warsaw radio. He is at pains to give both sides to the many problems he discusses, though the emphasis he puts on the role played by Russian troops in Poland is already outdated.

W. W. M.

NEW LIFE IN POLAND By Irving Brant (D. Dobson 2/-)

This booklet, just published in London, was written in the spring of 1946 by the American left-wing journalist Irving Brant.

It gives a picture of Poland a year ago as seen by the Polish Communist leaders. Only Communist ministers, with one exception, are quoted. It shows its readers the political and economic achievements of Poland from the point of view of the most influential members of the Warsaw government.

B.

EDUCATION

GENERAL EDUCATION IN A FREE SOCIETY By a Committee of Harvard University (O U P 10/6)

This longish book is the result of the deliberations of a Committee appointed in 1943 " to consider the Objectives of a General Education in a Free Society ", and arising out of their conclusions, to make recommendations for the practice and curriculum at Harvard College. The product, as is apt to be the case with the products of a committee, is rather on the longwinded side and tends to labour its generalisations ; nevertheless, it is worthy of careful consideration by all British educationalists, particularly those who are interested in implementing the 1944 Act through comprehensive high schools. The answers which the Harvard Committee gives to its questions will probably not be those

reached in Britain ; the tradition of British secondary and university education is too different, and two of the greatest problems of America, the problem of the foreign-born and that of the exceeding disparity of education in different States—since education is not a Federal concern—do not exist here at all. But the essential difficulty of " education for all ", which the authors describe as the difficulty of combining what they call " Jeffersonianism "—the full bringing out of the abilities of the gifted—with " Jacksonianism ", which means the adequate education of every citizen, is one which we too have to face, and to face quickly ; and the suggestions made in this book as to curriculum, etc. (which is cheap for its matter and content) may well set the British educationalist's mind to work on suggestions for his own country, as well as telling him a good deal about the States.

M. I. C.

MODERN EDUCATION—ITS AIMS AND METHODS By T. Raymont (New edition Longmans 8/6)

HISTORY, HERITAGE AND ENVIRONMENT. THE PLACE OF SOCIAL STUDIES IN SECONDARY SCHOOLS By H. B. McNicol (Faber 7/6)

Although Professor Raymont sketches the whole field of education, its history, theory and practice, his main concern, in fact, is with the State-provided schools ; and the intelligent citizen who wants to know what these schools have been doing to the children, and why—or the prospective teacher who is asking similar questions—will find a great deal of information and suggestion here. The author writes with studied balance, and his conclusions are staid : the enthusiasms of the more exciting educational individualists are not reflected in his pages. This is perhaps inevitable in a survey more or less restricted to orthodox and " provided " schools. But it provokes a recurrent misgiving. Is the extension of State control necessarily inimical to the liberties and tensions of a healthy educational system ?

On this question Mr McNicol's book both confirms doubt and raises hopes. His criticisms of officially approved and traditionally practised methods of teaching history are convincing and well documented ; and his thesis—that history should no longer be an isolated academic subject in the schools, but should be organic to integrated " Social Studies "—is surely irrefutable. Any worth-while study of educational aims and techniques is bound to raise problems beyond the scope of a brief review. This valuable little book will stimulate the general reader, and should be studied by any teacher whose own appetite for traditional historical study may have blinded him to its painful inadequacy in both primary and secondary schools.

K. H.

LABOUR LOOKS AT EDUCATION By Mark Starr (O U P 6/-)

The book traces the movement in America for equality of educational opportunity from the days of Benjamin Franklin. He describes the active part in the movement played by Trade Unions, their campaign to break down racial and class prejudice, and the old snobbish distinctions between labour of mind and of muscle, and to encourage education for leisure and for citizenship, and the study of the history and function of Trade Unionism.

B. D.

EDUCATION AND CRISIS By Basil A. Fletcher (U L Press 4/6)

In each chapter of the book two contrasting ideas are discussed, such as, propaganda and education, the individual and the group, equality and diversity, conscious and unconscious thought, love and lust, and an attempt is made to discover the synthesis that reconciles their apparent differences. The writer's analysis of the practical problems of education makes a valuable contribution to the re-thinking of some of life's deepest problems in a changing world.

B. D.

CHILDREN FROM TWO TO FIVE By D. A. Kennedy (Faber 3/6)

The book is a sensible and practical guide to the bringing up of young children. For the "devoted" mother who says tearfully to her husband "Why is Doris—or Brian—not more affectionate?" the writer characteristically can find no sympathy. The burden of gratitude is not to be laid on young shoulders.

B. D.

SOCIAL

THE MAKING OF SOCIAL POLICY By H. L. Beales (O U P 2/-)

In this Hobhouse Memorial Lecture Mr Beales reaffirms, against scepticism and reaction—most of it in the name of economic liberalism—the reality of moral progress as seen in the development of a purposive social policy. His illustrations are factual and eloquent, and his conclusion worth quotation: "The antithesis between freedom and organisation is no new one. Social policy is still a young, a twentieth-century, contributor to the totality of our well-being. In its essence it is a policy of freedom through organisation."

K. H.

CONDITIONS OF THE BRITISH PEOPLE—Wall Charts by Research Services Ltd. (O U P 18/- per set)

This is admirable material for the sociological teacher, or the over-night converted citizen. It provides not only a wealth of material for the social science learner but a counterblast to those who defended the "good old 30's". To be commended far and wide—all Fabian Groups should buy a copy and paste it up in their meeting rooms.

R. D.

FAMILIES IN TROUBLE By Earl Lomon Koos (O U P 15/6)

A series of studies, made over the period 1941–3, of some sixty families of a Middle East New York tenement block who were or had been "in trouble"—not legal trouble, but just not getting on well for some reason or other. The result shows that an obviously very intelligent and effective worker can in three years find out a great deal about the causes of family (and therefore of social) unhappiness which official agencies and enquiries fail to get at, and for which the culture pattern of modern cities provides no remedy. It makes interesting reading, though the problems of a group so largely foreign-born are different, naturally, from those of a similar group in London, say. But the obvious comment is that the enquiry, like the book itself, was tremendously expensive, and that it could not be used to cure social malaise on a grand scale.

M. I. C.

THE JUVENILE COURTS By F. T. Giles (Allen & Unwin 6/-)

Here is an answer to those who consider the methods of our juvenile courts too soft in dealing with the apparently increasing problem of delinquency. The problem is set in its true perspective by showing the place of the law among the more natural corrective influences in society, and by a conception of the delinquent as a sick child justifying reformative rather than deterrent treatment. The author upholds our system in contrast to that of the U S A. He might well have considered Scandinavian methods.

J. A.

INDUSTRIAL INJURIES By H. Samuels and R. S. W. Pollard (Stevens 3/-)
SMALL TRADERS AND THE LAW By H. I. Porter (Stevens 3/-)

These two little books are in a series called "This is the Law".

"Industrial Injuries" is a handy and useful summary of the National Insurance (Industrial Injuries) Act, 1946, with one or two useful explanations from the General Law, and an excellent short chapter on Alternative Remedies,

good Appendices and Index. It is an excellent summary and should be really useful to Trade Union officials and others concerned.

"Small Traders and the Law" attempts to cover so much ground that it must be used with great caution. For instance, the definition of fraud on page 45 is too wide, and so is the statement of remedies for fraud. Similarly the chapter on the Sale of Goods does not make it clear that a trader cannot return goods, which he could have rejected for misdescription but which he has accepted; and in practice misunderstandings on that point are frequent. It is impossible to deal with so many branches of the Law in a book of this size. Many regulations affecting the Small Trader are necessarily omitted.

G. R. M.

HEALTH

NOW FOR HEALTH By D. Stark Murray and L. C. J. McNae (St. Botolph Press 4/6)

The book is a first-rate finale to the "What, Why and How" of the new National Health Service Act. Health, the writer reminds us, is one of man's main pre-occupations. Yet, Topsy-like, health services in the past have "just grow'd." Health depends, on the one hand, on adequate diet, good housing, well-planned cities and factories, leisure and education. The rapid growth of medical science calls, on the other hand, for a new relationship between medicine and the State, between doctor and patient, hospital and home, for liaison above all between the ever-growing great army of people who fight against disease—doctors and nurses, specialists and the general practitioner—between these again and the laboratory technicians or the social worker. The National Health Service Act is the coping-stone of the Government's great new structure of social security.

B. D.

WHY NO NURSES ? By James Barclay (Faber 6/-)

This is an admirable book, clear, readable, and to the point. I hope it will be widely read, voluntarily by most of us; and administered with what force may be needed to Hospital Matrons and Superintendents with whom much of the blame for staff shortages must lie. Mr Barclay has some good proposals to make concerning accommodation and residence. He sees no need for the residence to be under the supervision of the matron of the hospital in which the girls pass their working hours. Selection, feeding, tutorial instruction, uniform, and many other questions are sensibly dealt with.

M. L.

ILL-HEALTH, POVERTY AND THE STATE By John Hewetson (Freedom Press 2/6)

A plea for the abolition of poverty by means of a state economy so planned that production shall be stimulated by need instead of by the expectation of profits on a sellers' market. The author devotes his space to an account of the adverse effects of an impoverished environment upon health, especially the health of the working class in Britain. Every statement is documented, and at first sight the book appears to be scholarly. On closer examination, however, there is seen to be a marked bias, rendering it partisan rather than scientific. Nevertheless, the main thesis is true; that there exists, in Britain today, much disease attributable to preventable poverty; and that it is a public duty to eliminate such poverty.

M. L.

THE HUMAN APPROACH By Henry Yellowlees (Churchill 10/6)

This is an enjoyable book, sure to have an appreciative public among students commencing their clinical work. It is not a textbook, being full of anecdotes and controversy; but it does better than many textbooks, for it succeeds in arousing interest in the author's "certain outlook on psychological medicine".

This outlook is "The Human Approach" to the realisation of every patient, not as "Case No. 12", but as a live fellow-being capable of upsetting mechanical calculations in diagnosis and treatment. All cases, whether "well", "organically ill" or "mental", need psychological understanding, and this is much easier if the physician has studied behaviour and motivation in a scientific manner. This means observation, not books.

The last chapters contain a very stimulating discussion of the scientific attitude in the practice of medicine.

M. L.

ECONOMICS and MISCELLANEOUS

INTERNATIONAL IMPLICATIONS OF FULL EMPLOYMENT IN GREAT BRITAIN By A. G. B. Fisher (Royal Institute of International Affairs 1946 202 pp. 15/-)

Professor Fisher, writing in close association with a group of economists in Chatham House, appears to argue that an "open international system" is of supreme value for Britain; that full employment is not compatible with it and must therefore be dropped. In two postscripts his colleagues record some disagreement. Unfortunately the light mist which hangs over Professor Fisher's writing in the early chapters on full employment quickly becomes an impenetrable fog, so that the reader never really knows what it is all about.

G. D. N. W.

BRETTON WOODS FOR BETTER OR WORSE By R. G. Hawtrey (Longmans Green 7/6)

Mr Hawtrey disputes the wisdom of the Bretton Woods plan for an International Monetary Fund, but on other grounds than those of the 'full employment club' school of economists. Mr Hawtrey's thesis is as follows. The soundness of an economy depends on its having a monetary unit of stable "wealth-value", i.e., monetary inflation or deflation must be avoided: the only effective means of achieving this is credit policy, with the bank-rate as its chief instrument: monetary expansion must be checked before it necessitates a drastic restriction: the International Fund provides only for international monetary expansion which will almost certainly go too far and result in a succeeding large-scale contraction. To discuss this thesis in general would involve re-opening the whole trade-cycle dispute. But one is forced to question whether, in an international economic situation where shortage of dollars is likely to be the chief impediment to trade, the proposed International Fund can be considered potentially expansionist, when the total of all currency quotas in the Fund is to be only about twice the volume of the American loan to Britain, and the U S quota little more than half the size of that individual loan (the proposed U S quota is 2,750 million dollars).

L. P.

NATIONAL ENTERPRISE By Ernest Davies, M P (Gollancz 6/-)

This sequel to National Capitalism closely analyses the 'administrative vehicle of nationalisation, the public corporation. The earlier work spotlighted the 'conscious villainy' of the pressure groups whose function was, and is, the protection of private monopoly capitalism. Here, Mr Davies more circumspectly condemns the myopic vision of the ministers who recruit directors of public boards, and he does not fail to recommend treatment. There are many who will endorse his criticisms of B B C, B O A C and London Transport directors.

The constitutional reforms advocated cannot be unconditionally supported but they merit close study. Chapter VI is a cogent plea for the decentralisation and democratisation of public industries and services. Without it, workers and 'the community' will not feel a personal sense of pride in the achievements of nationalised enterprises, nor will much enterprise be evident.

I. M.

A HISTORY OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT By K. B. Smellie (Allen & Unwin 7/6)

In 197 pages the author has included as well as essential facts, many of which are too little known, comments on present-day problems of local government, such as a local income tax and regionalism. The book is likely to become a textbook for classes in local government and every Labour councillor could profitably read it. A knowledge of this history not only makes local government work more interesting but makes it more comprehensible.

R. S. W. P.

ENTERPRISE FIRST By William Wallace (Longmans 8/6)

The author discusses the relationship between the State and industry, with particular reference to private enterprise. He is certainly, to say the least of it, among right-wing Socialists, but so long as there is a private sector in industry the problem of the relationship between the State and that sector is of crucial importance, and it is necessary to study all measures whereby a degree of initiative in that sector can be encouraged. It is in this connection that the present work deserves study.

B. M.

SOCIALISM OVER SIXTY YEARS (The Life of Jowett of Bradford) By Fenner Brockway (Allen & Unwin 16/–)

This is a history of the British Socialist Movement written round the life of Fred Jowett of Bradford, and the result is much more live and interesting than any "straight" history could be. Jowett never sought the limelight essential to the aspiring politician. The only ministerial post he held was the modest one of Commissioner of Public Works in the first Labour Government, but no national figure in the Movement has initiated so many measures of lasting values or has so influenced practical advance in social legislation. It was Jowett who first caused a municipality to undertake the feeding of school children. Jowett never sought popularity and was an implacable opponent of Imperialism. A reform strongly urged by Jowett throughout his life was the adoption of the Municipal Committee system in Parliament, an opinion held with equal consistency by Bernard Shaw.

Among a mass of interesting facts in this book, one is reminded that Jowett prohibited the use of white lead in paint used on Government buildings, and that he had added to the Nurse Cavell statue her immortal last words that had been carefully omitted, namely, "Patriotism is not enough. I must have no hate or bitterness for anyone."

He gave the Labour Party its name, was the first to suggest taxation of war profits, and coined the word "Profiteer".

Shortly before his death in 1944 Jowett wrote a sensational article on Bradford Seventy Years Ago, which is reprinted in this volume, together with a striking preface by J. B. Priestley.

A. E. D.

THE MASK OF DEMOCRACY By Hugo Dewar (I L P Publication 2d)

This little booklet acts like a cocktail, brightly stimulating for a short while and as quickly dying. The faults of the various forms of democracy are clearly indicated, the remedy vaguely to march carrying a blank and sloganless banner. Are there no links between progress and compromise ?

E. J. G.

LABOUR'S FIRST YEAR (Commonwealth Publications Ltd 6d)

A good if somewhat superficial summary of Labour's first year, not very deep or profound. Mildly critical and benign as one would expect from such a party as the Commonwealth Party.

E. J. G.

REPORT OF THE BRITISH COUNCIL 1945-46 (British Council) Free on Demand 3, Hanover Street, W 1

The British Council is the main channel through which British culture is exported to the world at large. The report provides an impressive record of activities in all quarters of the globe. In fact a sentence which appears in the section of the Report about Aden might be applied to the Council itself. It said " The Women's Institute has had a quietly successful year ". The number of distinguished people connected with the British Council is truly awe-inspiring, but one wonders if it might be possible to establish cultural contact with a wider audience abroad in a slightly less rarefied atmosphere.

R. B.

MONEY AND THE MACHINE AGE By T. W. Wyatt (Staples 1946 8/–)

This book was originally published in 1937, and though it was revised up to July 1945 much of it sounds oddly naive today, and there is distinct pre-war flavour about it. In the earlier part of the book, which seems substantially unrevised, the author advocates a considerable measure of Government control of industry as an alternative to nationalisation. Few will disagree with the importance he attached to increasing production and stepping up purchasing power, as a means of off-setting the possibility of trade depressions, but the economic set-up about which he writes is so much more 1937 than 1946 that many of his proposals sound unrealistic.

R. B.